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Abstract:	Can	human	life	have	value	in	a	world	in	which	humans	are	rendered	obsolete	by	technological	advances?	This	article	answers	this	question	by	developing	an	extended	analysis	of	the	axiological	impact	of	human	obsolescence.	In	doing	so,	it	makes	four	main	arguments.	First,	it	argues	that	human	obsolescence	is	a	complex	phenomenon	that	can	take	on	at	least	four	distinct	forms.	Second,	it	argues	that	one	of	these	forms	of	obsolescence	(‘actual-general’	obsolescence)	is	not	a	coherent	concept	and	hence	not	a	plausible	threat	to	human	well-being.	Third,	it	argues	that	existing	fears	of	technologically-induced	human	obsolescence	are	less	compelling	than	they	first	appear.	Fourth,	it	argues	that	there	are	two	reasons	for	embracing	a	world	of	widespread,	technologically-induced	human	obsolescence.		
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	 1.	Introduction	
Imagine	waking	up	one	morning	and	finding	out	that	you	are	no	longer	useful.	The	skills	that	you	spent	years	developing,	the	capacities	you	finely	honed	through	hours	of	practice,	are	all	yesterday's	news.	Thus	consigned	to	the	trash-heap	of	history,	how	would	you	feel?	Sad?	Angry?	Relieved?		
It	may	sound	fanciful,	but	with	rapid	technological	progress	answering	these	questions	has	become	a	pressing	concern.	As	new	technologies	develop,	
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old	ones	obsolesce.	Since	our	success	in	life	depends	largely	on	how	skillfully	we	wield	these	technologies	we	run	the	risk	of	becoming	obsolete	alongside	them	(Sparrow	2015	&	2019;	Currier	2015).	Indeed,	this	has	already	happened	to	some	of	us.	Generations	of	skilled	workers,	for	example,	have	seen	their	economic	usefulness	ebb	away	in	the	face	of	rampant	workplace	automation:	the	skills	they	developed	no	longer	suit	the	updated	technological	environment	(Frey	2019).	As	we	turn	the	lens	of	technological	development	on	ourselves,	and	see	our	bodies	and	brains	as	among	the	technologies	that	we	can	tinker	with	and	improve,	this	tendency	toward	obsolescence	is	likely	to	grow.	What	impact	will	this	have	on	the	value	of	our	lives?		
This	question	has	received	some	recent	attention	in	the	philosophical	literature	(Sparrow	2015	&	2019;	Danaher	2019b),	but	that	attention	has	been	largely	negative.	The	common	presumption	seems	to	be	that	technologically-induced	obsolescence	is	a	bad	thing	and	we	ought	to	do	what	we	can	to	mitigate	its	worst	effects.	In	this	article,	I	offer	a	more	positive	outlook.	I	argue	that	technologically-induced	human	obsolescence	can	be	welcomed	if	we	can	build	a	culture	that	embraces	its	advantages.	
I	defend	this	view	in	four	stages.	First,	I	clarify	what	is	meant	by	technologically-induced	obsolescence,	identify	the	primary	mechanisms	of	obsolescence,	and	classify	its	four	basic	forms.	Second,	I	consider	the	coherence	of	the	claim	that	humans	can	be	rendered	obsolete	by	technology,	arguing	that	there	are	versions	of	this	claim	that	are	plausible	and	others	that	are	not.	Third,	I	examine	and	challenge	the	claim	that	technologically-induced	obsolescence	is	a	bad	thing,	focusing	in	particular	on	arguments	presented	by	Robert	Sparrow	against	enhancement-induced	obsolescence.	Fourth,	and	finally,	I	present	two	arguments	for	thinking	that	technologically-induced	obsolescence	is	something	to	be	welcomed.	
	
2.	Understanding	Human	Obsolescence	
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Let's	start	with	the	nature	of	obsolescence.	I	will	discuss	this	initially	from	a	value-neutral	perspective.	In	other	words,	I	will	try	to	clarify	the	nature	of	the	phenomenon	and	not	pass	judgment	on	whether	it	is	a	good	or	bad	thing.	Adopting	this	stance	of	value-neutrality	is	tricky	since	the	word	‘obsolescence’	carries	pejorative	connotations	for	most	people.	Nevertheless,	it	is	essential	that	this	stance	of	value-neutrality	be	accepted	if	the	analysis	is	to	be	properly	appreciated.	For	example,	I	will,	in	this	section,	be	mentioning	disability	and	old	age	as	examples	of	obsolescence.	This	will	strike	many	people	as	an	offensive	thing	to	say.	Old	people	and	disabled	people	are	not	obsolescent!	I	quite	agree.	People	who	are	inclined	towards	this	interpretation	of	my	comments	should	bear	in	mind	the	stance	of	value-neutrality	that	is	being	adopted.	They	should	also	bear	in	mind	that	later	in	this	article	I	will	be	defending	the	idea	that	building	a	culture	of	obsolescence	is	a	good	thing	and	that	we	should	reject	the	notion	that	the	value	and	purpose	of	human	life	is	assessed	in	terms	of	whether	it	is	obsolescent	or	not.	In	this	respect,	my	analysis	of	the	relationship	between	technology	and	obsolescence	might	be	seen	to	be	consistent	with	recent	critical	analyses	of	the	relationship	between	technology	and	disability,	specifically	those	that	urge	us	to	move	away	from	the	belief	that	disabled	people	can	be	liberated	or	redeemed	by	technology	(e.g.	Nelson	et	al	2019;	Shew	2019;	Shew	2018).	
	With	that	caveat	in	mind	I	can	proceed	to	analyse	the	concept	of	obsolescence.	Obsolescence	is	the	state	of	no	longer	being	useful	or	used.	It	is	a	relative	phenomenon.	To	determine	whether	something	is	obsolescent	there	must	be	some	set	of	goals/standards	against	which	its	usefulness	can	be	measured.	In	measuring	this	usefulness,	we	can	distinguish	between	obsolescence	as	a	process	and	obsolescence	as	a	state	of	affairs.	Typically,	something	will	go	through	a	process	of	obsolescence	and	reach	the	state	of	affairs	
of	being	obsolete.	This	will	happen	if	the	thing	was	once	able	to	meet	the	relevant	goals	or	standards,	but	no	longer	can,	or,	alternatively,	if	it	is	no	longer	the	most	efficient	or	effective	means	of	achieving	those	goals	or	meeting	those	standards.	That	said,	it	may	also	be	possible	for	something	to	be	obsolete	simpliciter,	without	ever	having	gone	through	a	process	of	obsolescence.	This	would	happen	
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if	the	thing	was	never	able	to	reach	the	relevant	standards	or	achieve	the	relevant	goals.	
Whether	it	be	a	process	or	a	state	of	affairs,	obsolescence	can	never	be	determined	solely	by	examining	the	intrinsic	functionality	of	an	object	or	device	but,	rather,	only	by	looking	at	its	comparative	functionality.	For	example,	your	thirty-year	old	computer	may	still	function	adequately	in	some	respects	--	e.g.	you	may	be	able	to	use	its	word	processor	or	calculator	--	but	will	undoubtedly	face	problems	in	other	respects	--	e.g.	it	may	no	longer	be	updated	with	the	latest	software,	it	may	have	become	vulnerable	to	many	computer	viruses,	and	it	may	not	connect	to	the	internet	and	communicate	with	other	devices.	More	recent	models	will	be	much	more	effective	and	efficient	means	for	achieving	your	goals	because	they	can	smoothly	integrate	with	the	contemporary	technological	ecosystem.	Your	model	has	consequently	been	rendered	obsolete	by	changes	in	this	broader	technological	ecosystem	and	not	due	to	its	inherent	features.	
How	does	this	relativised	understanding	of	obsolescence	apply	to	human	beings?	To	put	it	briefly,	human	obsolescence	arises	from	a	mismatch	between	the	internal	capacities	of	the	human	being,	and	the	external	standards/goals	of	the	society	surrounding	that	human	being.	Each	human	being	has	some	set	of	cognitive,	emotional	and	physical	capacities	that	enables	them	to	perform	to	a	certain	standard	and	achieve	certain	goals.	These	standards	and	goals	are	set	by	economic,	political,	social	and	personal	forces.1	The	capacities	are	partly	innate	and	partly	a	function	of	how	the	individual	is	trained	and	educated.	Obsolescence	arises	when	the	internal	capacities	are	no	longer	able	to	meet	the	desired	standards	or	achieve	the	desired	goals.	To	give	an	example,	humans	who	are	really	good	at	performing	arithmetical	functions,	either	in	their	heads	or	with	the																																																									1	Here	is	another	place	where	my	discussion	of	obsolescence	links	up,	to	some	extent,	with	debates	about	disability.	My	definition	of	obsolescence,	as	something	that	arises	from	a	mismatch	between	intrinsic	capacities	and	external	standards	is	somewhat	similar	to	the	claim	made	by	the	various	‘social	models’	of	disability	(i.e.	models	that	claim	that	disability	is	not	something	intrinsic	to	the	person	but	rather	something	that	is,	at	least	in	part,	socially	determined).	2	Congenital	disability	might	be	a	different	case	since	there	is	no	decline	in	capacity	over	a	lifetime.	The	mismatch	between	intrinsic	ability	and	external	standards	may	exist	from	birth.	It	is	important	to	bear	in	mind,	however,	that	
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aid	of	pen	and	paper,	were	once	highly	demanded	in	scientific	and	military	research	(so-called	'human	computers').	They	have	since	been	rendered	obsolete	by	advances	in	digital	computing	technology.	This	is	not	because	these	humans	lost	their	internal	capacity	for	arithmetic;	it	is	rather	because	computing	technology	raised	the	expected	performance	benchmarks	to	a	level	that	humans	could	no	longer	match.	As	a	result,	human	computers	were	no	longer	deemed	economically	or	socially	useful,	and	there	was	no	incentive	to	train	the	skill	into	future	generations.	This	is	a	classic	example	of	technologically-induced	human	obsolescence.	
Not	all	forms	of	obsolescence	are	the	same,	and	not	all	are	technologically-induced.	There	are	at	least	three	primary	mechanisms	of	human	obsolescence:	
• Obsolescence	can	occur	if	there	is	some	decline	in	the	individual's	internal	capacities	(relative	to	their	own	historical	personal	baseline),	such	that	they	are	no	longer	able	to	achieve	the	relevant	goals	or	meet	the	preferred	standard.	This	is	something	that	can	happen	through	accident,	illness	or	old	age.	It	is	also,	controversially,	something	that	can	happen	through	acquired	disability.2	The	examples	of	old	age	and	disability	are	particularly	important	and	will	be	considered	in	more	detail	later	in	this	article.	
• Obsolescence	can	occur	if	there	is	some	change	in	the	external	standards	and	goals.	In	other	words,	economic	markets	and	social	institutions	can	change	in	such	a	way	that	the	internal	capacities	of	the	individual	no	longer	match	the	external	needs.	This	can	be	due	to	technological	change	(e.g.	as	in	the	case	of	the	switch	from	agricultural	to	industrial	societies	from	the	1750s	onwards)	or	other	cultural	and	social	change.	For	
																																																								2	Congenital	disability	might	be	a	different	case	since	there	is	no	decline	in	capacity	over	a	lifetime.	The	mismatch	between	intrinsic	ability	and	external	standards	may	exist	from	birth.	It	is	important	to	bear	in	mind,	however,	that	obsolescence	is	not	necessarily	the	same	thing	as	disability.	Someone	could	count	as	disabled	without	being	obsolescent	(according	to	my	definition)	and	vice	versa.	If	the	social	model	of	disability	is	adopted,	there	may	be	more	overlap	between	the	concepts.	
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example,	a	Catholic	priest	may	find	their	social	usefulness	under	siege	due	to	the	waning	influence	of	the	Church	in	developed	societies.	
• Obsolescence	can	occur	if	there	is	some	improvement	in	the	capacity	of	rivals	(i.e.	other	humans	or	machines)	such	that	the	individual's	performances,	although	still	matching	their	personal	baseline,	are	comparatively	worse.	This	is	what	happened	to	the	human	computers	when	digital	computers	came	along	and	it	is	a	particular	problem	in	the	case	of	competitive	goods	or	practices.	
Particular	episodes	of	obsolescence	may,	of	course,	result	from	a	combination	of	the	three	mechanisms.	
There	are	three	key	variables	that	moderate	the	impact	that	obsolescence	has	on	the	individual.	Two	of	these	have	previously	been	described	by	Robert	Sparrow	(2015	&	2019).	The	first	is	the	pace	of	change:	in	other	words,	how	fast	rivals	are	getting	better,	standards	changing,	and	capacities	declining.	The	faster	the	pace	of	change,	the	more	disruptive	it	is	likely	to	be	to	the	individual's	sense	of	worth	and	social	meaning;	the	slower	the	pace	of	change,	the	more	likely	it	is	that	the	individual	can	adjust	to	the	new	reality.	Alvin	and	Heidi	Toffler's	1970	book	Future	Shock	is	a	classic	exploration	of	this	problem,	describing	in	some	detail	the	existential	angst	that	occurs	when	humans	cannot	keep	up	with	the	pace	of	social	change.		
The	second	variable	is	the	adaptability	and	updateability	of	the	human	being:	in	other	words,	whether	they	can	retrain	or	reskill	themselves	in	such	a	way	that	they	can	offset	the	impact	of	obsolescence	or,	at	the	very	least,	find	some	other	calling	in	life	in	which	they	are	still	capable	of	performing	to	the	desired	standard.	If	they	can,	then	the	disruptive	impact	of	obsolescence	can	be	reduced.	
The	third	variable	is	the	adapatability	of	the	society	around	the	individual:	in	other	words	can	society	recognise	the	individual’s	obsolescence	in	a	particular	domain	and	then	adapt	and	find	other	outlets	for	that	person’s	capacities.	When	artificial	computers	rendered	human	computers	obsolete,	did	
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society	find	other	job	opportunities	and	outlets	for	these	individuals?	Could	it	change	its	norms	and	practices	to	accommodate	these	newly	obsolete	workers?	The	adaptability	of	society,	as	we	shall	see	below,	might	be	the	key	to	mitigating	the	worst	effects	of	obsolescence.		
	 Not	only	are	there	different	mechanisms	underlying	obsolescence,	there	are	also	different	forms	that	the	resulting	obsolescence	can	take.	Four	are	particularly	important	when	it	comes	to	assessing	the	axiological	impact	of	obsolescence.	They	are:	
• Actual	Obsolescence:	This	arises	when	an	individual	experiences	some	genuine	and	objectively	determinable	form	of	obsolescence,	i.e.	their	internal	capacities	can	be	shown	to	no	longer	meet	the	desired	performance	standards	or	achieve	the	desired	goals.	
• Perceived	Obsolescence:	This	arises	when	the	individual	believes	themselves	(or	is	believed	by	others)	to	be	obsolete.	This	can	occur	in	the	absence	of	actual	obsolescence.	For	example,	elderly	people	and	disabled	people	are	are	sometimes	falsely	assumed	to	be	obsolescent	with	respect	to	certain	economic	skills	when	they	are	actually	perfectly	capable	of	performing	to	the	relevant	standard.	They	experience	perceived	obsolescence	but	not	actual	obsolescence.	
• Narrow	Obsolescence:	This	arises	when	the	individual	undergoes	obsolescence	with	respect	to	some	specific	or	narrow	range	of	activities	and	skills.	
• General	Obsolescence:	This	arises	when	the	individual	undergoes	obsolescence	with	respect	to	a	broad	range	(conceivably	all	known)	activities	and	skills.	
The	line	separating	narrow	and	general	obsolescence	is	not	a	sharp	one;	it	is	blurry	and	the	two	fade	into	one	another.	In	a	sense	then	they	form	a	single	dimension	along	which	cases	of	obsolescence	can	vary.	Obviously,	the	most	extreme	form	of	general	obsolescence	arises	when	the	individual	is	no	longer	capable	of	anything,	but	presumably	there	could	be	cases	in	which	someone	is	capable	of	meeting	one	or	two	external	performance	standards	but	otherwise	
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suffers	from	such	widescale	loss	in	ability	that	it	might	be	right	to	refer	to	their	case	as	one	of	general	or	at	least	extremely	broad	obsolescence.	The	actual-perceived	distinction	is	somewhat	different	insofar	as	it	focuses	on	the	difference	between	subjective	beliefs	and	objective	reality.	That	said,	what	counts	as	the	objective	reality	is	often	determined	by	intersubjective	agreement	so	the	line	between	the	two	may	also	be	somewhat	blurry	and	they	may	form	a	single	dimension	of	variance.	In	the	next	section	we	will	arrange	these	four	types	of	obsolescence	into	a	simply	2-by-2	matrix	that	supports	this	‘dimensional’	interpretation.	
	 Each	of	these	four	forms	of	obsolescence	has	different	potential	axiological	impacts.	Prima	facie,	the	worst	kind	of	obsolescence	would	be	actual-
general	obsolescence	because	it	implies	some	catastrophic	and	genuine	loss	in	the	ability	to	participate	in	society.	Narrow	and	perceived	forms	of	obsolescence	look	less	concerning	because	they	often	have	readily-identifiable	solutions:	the	human	can	switch	to	another	domain	of	activity	or,	in	the	latter	case,	try	to	change	their	perception	of	the	situation.	But	we	shouldn't	be	too	hasty	in	reaching	such	conclusions.	Changing	perceptions	and	changing	domains	of	activity	can	be	practically	difficult.	Furthermore,	one	of	the	major	goals	of	this	article	is	to	argue	that	even	very	broad	forms	of	obsolescence	might	be	better	than	we	are	initially	inclined	to	think.	
Before	we	reach	this	conclusion,	however,	we	first	need	to	conduct	a	deeper	investigation	into	the	coherence	of	obsolescence.	Is	it	really	possible	for	humans	to	obsolesce	in	a	general	or	narrow	sense?	
	
3.	Is	Human	Obsolescence	Possible?	
It	might	be	argued	that	it	isn't	coherent	to	suggest	that	humans	can	obsolesce.	Humans,	it	could	be	said,	do	not	serve	purposes	and	so	to	suggest	that	they	could	be	rendered	obsolescent	by	technology	is	both	implausible	and	non-sensical.	Is	that	right?	Answering	this	question	is	important.	If	technologically-induce
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point	in	addressing	its	broader	axiological	impact.	If	it	is,	then	this	investigation	is	worthwhile.	
To	assess	the	plausibility	and	coherence	of	human	obsolescence,	we	need	to	consider	the	different	forms	of	obsolescence	outlined	in	the	previous	section.	Doing	so,	we	see	that	there	isn't	just	one	question	to	deal	with	here;	there	are	four.	We	are	not	just	asking	whether	obsolescence,	in	general,	is	coherent	and	plausible;	we	are	asking	whether	actual-general,	actual-narrow,	perceived-general	and	perceived-narrow	forms	of	obsolescence	are	coherent	and	plausible.	For	ease	of	analysis,	we	can	arrange	these	four	possibilities	into	a	two-by-two	matrix.	I	have	done	this	in	Table	1	and	suggested	some	answers	to	the	question	of	whether	each	is	plausible	and	coherent.	
	
	
Actual	 Perceived	
General	 Uncertain	 Plausible	and	coherent	
Narrow	 Plausible;	historically	confirmed	 Plausible;	historically	confirmed	
Table	1	–	Forms	of	Obsolescence	
As	you	can	see,	I	believe	that	all	but	one	of	these	four	forms	of	obsolescence	is	plausible	and	coherent.	The	one	exception	is	actual-general	obsolescence,	which	I	have	earmarked	as	being	of	uncertain	plausibility.	Let	me	explain	the	reasons	for	my	assessments	of	the	four	possibilities	in	what	follows.	
I'll	start	by	explaining	why	I	think	both	of	the	narrow	forms	of	obsolescence	are	plausible.	The	obvious	reason	is	that	both	have	already	happened.	The	examples	given	in	the	previous	section	illustrate	this.	For	instance,	one	could	argue	that	the	history	of	workplace	automation	reads	as	a	litany	of	narrow	forms	of	technologically-induced	obsolescence	(Danaher	2019a;	Frey	2019).	Some	of	these	are	actual	in	nature:	specific	human	capacities	are	no	longer	objectively	useful	in	the	workplace;	some	of	these	are	perceived:	the	
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human-performed	skill	still	has	some	utility	but	is	perceived	to	be	useless	by	the	individual	and	the	society	around	him/her	and	so	is	not	developed	any	further.	
The	two	forms	of	general	obsolescence	are	the	trickier	cases.	To	suggest	that	humans	could	become	generally	obsolescent	commits	the	fallacy	of	supposing	that	humans	serve	a	finite	number	of	purposes	and	so	as	soon	as	they	lose	the	capacity	to	serve	all	those	purposes	(either	due	to	internal	or	external	factors)	they	become	generally	obsolescent.	This	seems	like	it	must	be	false.	Humans	do	not	serve	a	finite	number	of	purposes.	Humans	are	an	adaptable	and	flexible	species.	Humans	find	entertainment	and	a	sense	of	meaning	in	a	diverse	range	of	activities.	Humans	are	constantly	finding	new	activities	and	new	purposes.	There	doesn't	seem	to	be	any	obvious	limit	to	the	purposes	they	can	serve.	Furthermore,	even	when	human	capacities	do	suffer	from	some	comparative	or	absolute	decline	relative	to,	say,	machines,	they	still	find	it	meaningful	to	engage	in	certain	activities.	Game-playing	is	a	classic	example	of	this.	It	has	long	been	the	case	that	machines	have	been	capable	of	outperforming	humans	in	chess.	In	the	strict	sense,	then,	humans	are	actually	obsolete	
when	it	comes	to	chess	playing.	But	human	chess-playing	tournaments	are	still	very	popular	and	competitive.	People	work	hard	at	improving	their	abilities	in	chess	and	derive	a	lot	of	satisfaction	and	meaning	from	doing	so.	Consequently,	at	least	in	this	one	domain,	technological	inferiority	hasn't	resulted	in	a	loss	of	human	opportunity	or	of	an	outlet	for	human	flourishing.		
It	is	worth	reflecting	in	more	detail	on	why	this	might	be	true.	Remember,	it	is	not	because	humans	can	never	become	obsolete	in	certain	activities	--	the	historical	examples	of	narrow	obsolescence	prove	that	they	can	--	it	is	because	some	human	activities,	such	as	chess,	are	not	defined	or	valued	in	terms	of	the	instrumental	value	they	serve.	Compare	games	with	workplace	activities.	Workplace	activities	are	primarily	valued	for	their	instrumental	purposes:	do	they	make	a	company	more	profitable,	do	they	contribute	to	economic	growth?	If	machines	can	achieve	those	ends	more	efficiently	and	effectively	than	humans,	or	if	humans	decline	in	their	capacity	(relatively	or	absolutely)	such	that	they	no	longer	meet	the	performance	benchmarks,	then	obsolescence	in	the	workplace	is	possible.	This	does	not	mean	that	workplace	activities	have	no	intrinsic	purpose	
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or	value;	it	just	means	that	if	they	didn’t	serve	the	instrumental	(and	economic)	needs	of	the	individuals	and	corporations	in	question,	they	would	not	required.	But	games	are	different.	They	are	not	valued	primarily	for	the	instrumental	ends	they	serve	(e.g.	the	fame,	glory	or	wealth	of	the	participants)	but	for	the	kinds	of	skilled	performances	that	are	intrinsic	to	the	game	and	the	pleasure	they	give	to	the	performers.	As	long	as	humans	are	capable	of	participating	in	those	performances,	they	will	not	be	rendered	obsolete	from	those	domains	of	activity.	The	idea	of	obsolescence	simply	makes	no	sense	when	applied	to	them.	Presumably,	something	similar	will	be	true	for	other	non-game	domains,	such	as	nurturing	friendships	and	family	relationships.	Although	they	may	serve	instrumental	ends,	they	are	not	primarily	valued	in	terms	of	those	instrumental	ends.		
The	bottom	line,	then,	is	that	general	forms	of	obsolescence	seem	to	be	implausible	because	(a)	there	doesn't	appear	to	be	a	finite	number	of	activities	and	purposes	that	humans	serve	(or,	at	the	very	least,	the	set	of	activities	is	larger	than	humans	can	practically	exhaust);	and	(b)	at	least	some	human	activities	are	resistant	to	the	dynamics	of	obsolescence	because	they	are	valued	for	their	intrinsic	performances	and	not	their	ultimate	ends.	
But	why	then	did	I	say	that	actual-general	obsolescence	is	of	uncertain	status	as	opposed	to	saying	that	it	is	genuinely	implausible?	There	are	three	reasons	for	this.	First,	in	some	extreme	cases,	actual-general	obsolescence	is	a	possibility.	For	example,	certain	individuals	may	experience	a	catastrophic	loss	of	capacity	due	to	accident	or	severe	disability	(e.g.	someone	in	a	persistent	vegetative	state).	This	individual	may	be	generally	obsolescent,	for	all	intents	and	purposes.	That	said,	these	cases	are	likely	to	be	rare	and	not	attributable	to	technologically-induced	changes.3	Second,	even	though	it	seems	plausible	to	suggest	that	we	can	always	find	new	purposes	and	new	non-instrumental	activities	to	while	away	the	hours,	this	may	be	more	true	in	principle	than	in	practice.	Society	might	struggle	to	adapt	to	rapid	technological	change	and	create																																																									3	It	is	also	true	to	say	that	in	the	extreme	case	we	all	die	and	thus	become	generally	obsolescent,	but	presumably	that	shouldn't	count	as	an	example	of	obsolescence	since	one	must	still	exist	in	order	to	count	as	obsolescent.	
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new	opportunities.	For	example,	at	the	moment	we	live	in	societies	that	are	deeply	wedded	to	the	work	ethic	and	the	productive	demands	of	capitalism.		This	is	a	society	in	which	fears	of	obsolescence	are	palpable.	There	is	a	significant	amount	of	cultural	baggage	and	institutional	inertia	built	up	around	these	practices.	If	there	is	some	rapid,	technologically-induced	obsolescence	with	respect	to	the	human	capacity	to	contribute	to	the	capitalist	demands,	these	institutions	may	not	be	able	to	adapt	to	the	new	reality.	Consequently,	for	all	practical	purposes,	some	people	may	be	rendered	generally	obsolescent	within	our	current	social	order	(in	Marxist	theory	this	is	referred	to	as	the	problem	of	'surplus	populations',	i.e.	populations	of	people	not	needed	for	capitalist	production	–	Srnicek	and	Williams	2015).	Third,	as	will	be	discussed	in	more	detail	below,	the	problem	of	obsolescence	may	manifest	itself	even	in	non-instrumentalist	domains	of	activity,	if	individuals	suffer	from	comparative	loss	relative	to	the	other	humans	(not	machines)	participating	in	those	activities.		
It	is	worth	bearing	in	mind	that	the	scepticism	about	general	obsolescence	applies	only	to	actual-general	cases	of	obsolescence.	General-perceived	obsolescence	is	a	much	more	tangible	possibility.	Even	if	there	are	other	things	humans	could	do	to	find	a	sense	of	purpose	or	meaning,	they	might	not	be	able	to	see	this	or	they	may	be	actively	encouraged	not	to	see	it.	The	dynamics	of	obsolescence	in	old	age	are	an	obvious	case	in	point.	Several	philosophers		have	pointed	out	that	there	is	a	tendency	in	Western	societies	to	assume	that	the	elderly	have	nothing	to	contribute	to	society,	even	when	this	is	not	actually	true	(De	Beauvoir	1996;	Baars	2012	&	2017;	Harriott	2006).	The	result	of	this	widespread	assumption	is	that	both	they	and	their	family	and	friends	perceive	them	to	be	obsolescent:	to	be	a	burden	on	the	younger	population.	There	is	pushback	against	this	perception,	and	there	are	various	attempts	to	have	the	capacities	of	the	elderly	valued	and	recognised,	but	the	perception	is	still	out	there.		Similar	problems	of	perception	affect	disabled	persons.	
In	conclusion,	then,	at	least	three	of	the	four	forms	of	obsolescence	are	plausible	and	coherent.	Furthermore,	the	fourth,	while	perhaps	not	plausible	in	principle,	may	become	a	practical	reality	due	to	institutional	and	cultural	inertia.	
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Consequently,	an	investigation	into	the	axiology	of	human	obsolescence	in	its	general	and	narrow	forms	is	justifiable.	In	the	remainder	of	this	article,	I	will	conduct	such	an	investigation,	focusing	specifically	on	obsolescence	that	is	induced	by	technological	change.	
	
4.	The	Case	Against	Technologically-Induced	Obsolescence	
Extended	discussions	of	the	axiological	impact	of	technologically-induced	human	obsolescence	are	rare.	This	is	not	to	say	that	they	are	non-existent,	or	that	one	cannot	infer	opinions	about	obsolescence	from	sources	that	do	not	discuss	the	phenomenon	directly.		
For	example,	there	are	several	books	and	articles	that	discuss	the	impact	of	technology	on	specific	human	values	(e.g.	the	impact	of	AI	on	equality	or	the	impact	of	human	enhancement	on	autonomy),	and	one	can	generalise	from	these	to	reach	conclusions	about	obsolescence.	For	instance,	people	who	worry	about	the	impact	of	AI	on	income	inequality	are	often,	implicitly,	worrying	that	disadvantaged	groups	will	be	rendered	economically	obsolete	as	a	result	and	that	this	will	be	a	bad	thing	(e.g.	Brynjolfsson	and	McAfee	2014;	Ford	2015;	Danaher	2019a).	
Direct	discussions	of	the	axiological	impact	of	technologically-induced	obsolescence	are	much	more	limited.	One	potential	exception	is	Agar	(2013	and	2019)	who	looks	at	the	impact	of	both	enhancement	technology	and	digital	technology	on	human	well-being.	He	worries,	in	particular,	that	certain	forms	of	technological	and	digital	enhancement	of	ourselves	and	our	economy	will	leave	humanity	as	we	know	and	value	it	behind.	In	response	to	this,	he	argues	that	we	need	to	either	resist	some	radical	technological	transformations	(Agar	2013)	and/or	find	a	complementary	space	for	humans	alongside	technology	in	order	to	maintain	our	flourishing	and	well-being	(Agar	2019).		Another	potential	exception	is	Danaher	(2019a	and	2019b),	who	discusses	the	impact	of	robotics	and	AI	on	the	human	capacity	for	agency	and	who	also	explicitly	begins	one	of	his	discussions	with	the	observation	that	‘human	obsolescence	is	imminent’	
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(2019a,	1).	The	gist	of	Danaher’s	argument	is	that	technological	advances	in	automating	technologies	tend	to	obviate	the	need	for	human	action	and	initiative	in	the	world,	and	thus	reduce	humans	to	moral	patients:	passive	recipients	of	the	benefits	that	technology	can	bring,	not	active	shapers	of	the	world.	If	this	trend	continues	to	an	extreme,	this	could	result	in	a	widescale	form	of	obsolescence.	Danaher	argues	that	this	would	have	a	devastating	impact	on	the	current	(Western-liberal)	value	system	since	that	value	system	currently	prioritises	and	valorises	human	agency	and	responsibility.	That	said,	Danaher	never	fully	fleshes	out	what	he	means	by	obsolescence	nor	does	he	continue	the	theme	of	obsolescence	throughout	his	work.	Instead,	to	the	extent	that	he	can	be	said	to	critique	technologically-induced	obsolescence,	he	focuses	on	specific	threats	to	specific	human	values	(such	as	autonomy,	agency	and	responsibility),	and	not	the	phenomenon	of	obsolescence	itself.	
These	examples	notwithstanding	it	is	Robert	Sparrow	who	has	developed	the	most	extended	and	concrete	analysis	of	technologically-induced	obsolescence	to	date	(2015	and	2019).	His	analysis	focuses	specifically	on	a	form	of	obsolescence	that	is	induced	by	advances	in	human	enhancement	technology.	He	claims	that	rapid	improvements	in	the	technology	of	human	enhancement	will	result	in	a	comparative	decline	in	the	capacity	of	individual	humans	to	reach	external	performance	benchmarks.	In	other	words,	if	a	particular	human	subject	(S1)	chooses	to	undergo	enhancement	at	a	particular	moment	in	time	(T1),	and	if	the	technology	of	human	enhancement	rapidly	improves	over	time,	then	S1	will	find	himself	at	a	comparative	disadvantage	relative	to	S2	who	chose	to	enhance	at	T2	(who	will,	in	turn,	find	himself	at	a	comparative	disadvantage	to	S3	who	chose	to	enhance	at	T3).	If	the	technological	improvements	come	quickly,	and	if	individuals	are	unable	to	update	their	enhancements	in	line	with	these	changes,	they	will	soon	obsolesce.	This	will	have	a	range	of	devastating	axiological	impacts,	five	of	which	feature	prominently	in	Sparrow's	writings.	
First,	Sparrow	argues	that	rapid	human	obsolescence	will	exacerbate	the	worst	features	of	capitalism.	In	capitalist	societies	people	are	largely	valued	for	their	economic	productivity:	if	they	cannot	contribute	to	the	economic	bottom	
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result	in	increased	competition	for	productive	jobs	and	opportunities,	increased	perception	of	uselessness,	compressed	periods	of	peak	productivity,	increased	intergenerational	inequity	(because	later	generations	of	enhanced	humans	have	an	advantage	over	earlier	ones),	an	overall	loss	of	individual	resiliency,	and	increased	dependency	on	others.	
Second,	Sparrow	argues	that	the	dynamics	of	rapid	obsolescence	will	take	a	toll	on	the	individual's	subjective	outlook.	There	will	be	an	increased	sense	of	regret	associated	with	the	decision	to	undergo	enhancement.	No	matter	what	point	in	time	you	pick	to	enhance	yourself	(or	no	matter	what	time	others	decide	for	you),	you	will	always	have	the	sense	that	you	enhanced	too	soon,	that	you	should	have	waited	a	little	longer	until	the	next	round	of	technological	improvements	came	onboard.	This	will	give	rise	to	a	more	serious	variation	on	the	"option	regret"	people	sometimes	experience	when	they	buy	a	smartphone	model	that	is	quickly	superseded	by	the	latest	generation	of	devices.	Sparrow	argues	that	this	option	regret	will	undermine	our	sense	of	gratitude	--	we	will	feel	more	responsible	for	our	own	failures	and	less	grateful	for	what	we	have.44.	It	will	also	result	in	increased	status	anxiety,	as	we	become	more	conscious	of	the	precarious	nature	of	our	social	standing:	soon	to	be	nullified	by	the	latest	generation	of	enhanced	humans.	
Third,	Sparrow	argues	that	this	type	of	obsolescence	is	a	particular	problem	for	certain	forms	of	human	enhancement.	For	example,	human	life	extension	and	genetic	enhancement.	It	is	much	worse,	according	to	Sparrow,	to	live	a	greatly	extended	life	in	a	state	of	obsolescence	than	to	live	a	normal	one.	Imagine	living	to	be	1,000	years	old	but	spending	950	of	those	years	being	obsolescent	in	the	eyes	of	the	society	in	which	you	live.	It	doesn't	sound	very	nice,	does	it?	Similarly,	Sparrow	argues	that	genetic	enhancements	for	our	offspring	will	be	a	particular	problem	if	those	enhancements	rapidly	obsolesce.	If	children	quickly	become	obsolete,	they	will	grow	up	resentful	of	the	fact	that	they	were	born	too	soon	and	will	acquire	the	sense	that	they	are	all	'yesterday's	children'	(Sparrow	2019).																																																									4	This,	of	course,	is	a	common	objection	to	the	project	of	human	enhancement.	See,	for	example,	Habermas	2003,	Sandel	2007	and	Nagel	2010.	
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Fourth,	Sparrow	argues	that	obsolescence	poses	axiological	challenges	even	when	enhancements	are	pursued	for	absolute	or	intrinsic	reasons.	Some	proponents	of	enhancement	argue	that	there	are	intrinsic	reasons	to	favour	enhancement	--	that	it	is	desirable	to	be	enhanced	in	and	of	itself,	not	just	because	of	the	positional	advantage	that	the	enhanced	have	over	the	unenhanced.	They	claim	that	it	is	a	good	thing	to	have	enhanced	cognitive	capacity,	or	an	enhanced	sense	of	well-being,	even	if	your	enhancements	don't	bring	you	up	to	the	level	of	some	other	super-enhanced	individual.	For	example,	we	can	derive	intrinsic	satisfaction	from	our	improved	ability	to	solve	Sudoku	puzzles;	we	don't	need	to	win	the	Sudoku	world	championships	to	have	this	satisfaction	(this	is	somewhat	analogous	to	the	chess	example	given	earlier).	But	Sparrow	argues	that	it	is	not	so	easy	to	embrace	the	intrinsic	virtues	of	enhancement.	Even	if	certain	enhancements	are	intrinsically	valuable,	it	will	be	hard	to	avoid	being	aware	of	the	fact	that	you	are	comparatively	worse	than	others	with	respect	to	those	enhancements.	Even	if	you	can	yourself	solve	the	Sudoko	puzzle	you	do	so	in	the	shadow	of	those	who	can	solve	them	faster.	In	this	regard,	Sparrow's	argument	is	similar	to	one	made	Robert	Nozick	regarding	the	nature	of	self-esteem	(Nozick	1974;	Mason	1990).	Nozick	argued	that	our	sense	of	self-esteem	is	almost	always	derived	from	a	comparison	of	our	abilities	with	those	of	others:	if	we	rank	highly	relative	to	others	we	will	have	a	high	sense	of	self-esteem;	if	we	rank	lowly	we	won't.	Sparrow	is	suggesting	that	something	similar	will	be	true	with	respect	to	our	intrinsic	satisfaction	with	our	enhancements.	
Fifth,	and	finally,	Sparrow	argues	that	it	is	difficult	to	avoid	the	problems	of	obsolescence	if	you	wish	to	pursue	the	goal	of	human	enhancement.	This	is	because	the	desire	to	technologically	enhance	ourselves	is	driven,	in	part,	by	the	belief	that	we	(in	our	current	form)	ought	to	become	obsolescent.	It	is	not	easy	to	sidestep	this	by	arguing	that	certain	forms	of	enhancement	could	be	used	to	mitigate	the	negative	consequences	of	obsolescence	(e.g.	moral	enhancement	that	might	make	us	more	egalitarian	and	enlightened	about	the	fate	of	our	obsolescent	peers),	or	by	hoping	that	there	will	be	some	general	social	reform	that	minimises	the	impact	of	obsolescence.	These	hopes	are	speculative	and	
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contrary	to	the	underlying	ethos	of	enhancement	which	is	to	improve	that	which	is	imperfect.	
These	five	reasons	lead	Sparrow	to	conclude	that	enhancement-induced	obsolescence	would	be	a	very	bad	thing	for	humanity.	He	suggests	that	we	should	avoid	the	narrative	of	"naive	inevitabilism"	about	the	march	of	technological	progress,	and	instead	consider	taking	regulatory	steps	to	prevent	or	slow	down	the	march	toward	human	obsolescence	(Sparrow	2015).	
Although	Sparrow	traces	out	the	consequences	of	enhancement-induced	obsolescence	in	some	detail,	his	analysis	is	limited	in	crucial	respects.	He	focuses	on	just	one	potential	mechanism	of	obsolescence	to	the	exclusion	of	others.	He	imagines	a	world	in	which	humans	themselves	are	the	technology	that	is	being	rapidly	improved	and	so	it	is	relative	to	other	human	beings	that	we	are	rendered	obsolescent.	With	an	eye	to	human	history,	this	is	not	the	most	common	mechanism	of	technologically-induced	obsolescence.	It	is	not	usually	relative	to	one	another	that	we	become	obsolescent	(except	in	the	case	of	ageing).	It	is,	rather,	relative	to	our	technologies,	machines	and	social	orders	that	we	become	obsolescent.	Human	biology	and	physiology	has	remained	remarkably	consistent	over	the	past	40,000	years	or	so.	Despite	all	the	stürm	and	drang	from	philosophers	and	bioethicists	about	the	prospect	of	radically	enhanced	human	beings,	it	is	primarily	through	external	technological	improvements	that	we	'enhance'	ourselves.	This	is	not	to	say	that	human	enhancement	is	impossible	or	will	never	happen	--	the	development	of	CRISPR	Cass	9	and	its	implications	for	genetic	engineering	are	tantalising	--	but	it	is	to	suggest	that	if	we	are	worried	about	the	prospects	of	widespread	human	obsolescence,	we	may	be	looking	in	the	wrong	place	if	we	focus	our	attention	on	human	enhancement.		
Rapid	advances	in	automating	technologies	(i.e.	robotics	and	AI)	combined	with	associated	cultural	changes	in	how	we	organise	and	run	our	societies	to	take	advantage	of	these	technologies,	seem	to	pose	a	much	more	credible	threat.	Consider	an	example.	If	autonomous	vehicles	have	the	safety	benefits	that	are	claimed	by	the	manufacturers,	and	if	they	are	cheaper	and	more	
	 18	
efficient	than	human-driven	vehicles	(big	caveats),	then	we	can	expect	human	drivers	to	become	relatively	obsolete	and	we	can	expect	a	change	in	cultural	and	legal	norms	associated	with	human	driving.	In	the	extreme,	human-driving	may	start	to	be	seen	as	ethically	on	a	par	with	drink-driving:	something	that	just	shouldn't	happen	in	a	well-functioning	society.	Less	extreme,	human-driving	may	be	heavily	discouraged,	like	speeding	is	nowadays.	Humans	may	start	to	see	their	own	participation	in	driving	as	a	moral	luxury	and	chastise	themselves	and	one	another	for	indulging	in	it	(Nyholm	and	Smids	2018;	Nyholm	2020).	We	can	also	expect	typical	economic	logic	to	take	over	in	the	field	of	driving-related	employment.	Employers	will	be	incentivised	to	drop	costly	and	risk-prone	human	drivers	in	favour	of	their	robotic	equivalents.	The	net	result	is	that	humans	will	be	rendered	obsolete	(for	actual	and	perceived	reasons)	from	this	domain	of	activity.	Multiply	this	over	and	over	again	for	all	the	possible	use	cases	for	advances	in	automating	technologies,	and	you	have	a	credible	and	looming	threat	of	widescale	human	obsolescence	that	has	nothing	to	do	with	human	enhancement.	
This	matters	because	the	mechanism	of	obsolescence	can	be	expected	to	make	some	difference	to	the	axiological	impact	of	that	obsolescence.	Humans	are	naturally	social	and	competitive	(Erdi	2019).	We	instinctively	compare	and	rank	ourselves	relative	to	one	another.	To	be	rendered	obsolete	by	our	fellow	human	beings	has	deeper,	instinctual	resonance	than	does	being	rendered	obsolete	by	machines.	Enhanced	obsolecence	means	we	have	lost	ranking	relative	to	one	another,	and	not	relative	to	some	external	force.	There	might	be	a	better	chance	of	building	a	narrative	of	community	solidarity	around	machine-induced	obsolescence	than	there	is	around	enhancement-induced	obsolescence.		
Consider	an	example.	Imagine	you	have	a	factory	full	of	human	workers.	Suppose	the	factory	goes	out	of	business	because	the	product	they	make	is	now	obsolete.	Would	that	be	worse	for	the	community	of	workers	than	if,	say,	half	of	them	had	been	fired	for	perceived	under-performance?	While	both	scenarios	are	tragic	for	the	workers,	we	might	expect	the	latter	to	fragment	the	community	and	create	bitter	competitions	and	resentments.	The	former,	on	the	contrary,	might	actually	foster	greater	solidarity:	since	all	workers	have	been	equally	
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affected	by	the	external	technological	changes	there	are	legitimate	grounds	for	favouring	group	empathy	and	solidarity	to	get	through	this	difficult	time.	A	similar	dynamic	might	be	expected	to	arise	in	the	case	of	a	group	of	drivers	rendered	obsolete	by	a	fleet	of	autonomous	vehicles	--	more	so	than	if	a	subset	are	rendered	obsolete	relative	to	enhanced	human	drivers	anyway.		
The	point	here	is	twofold:	(i)	Sparrow's	critique	of	obsolescence	focuses	on	the	relatively	speculative	threat	of	enhancement-induced	obsolescence,	and	not	on	the	more	credible	threat	of	automation-induced	obsolescence;	and	(ii)	some	of	the	negative	axiological	impacts	he	identifies,	specifically	those	having	to	do	with	lost	or	constrained	individual	productivity,	excess	competition	and	status	anxiety,	might	be	less	warranted	in	the	latter	case.	This	doesn't	mean	that	they	won't	arise	as	a	matter	of	fact;	it	just	means	that	there	is	less	normative	justification	for	them.	You	are	not	being	rendered	obsolete	because	of	some	individual	failing	and	senescence.	You	are	being	rendered	obsolete	for	reasons	beyond	your	control.	This	may	be	tragic	but	because	the	obsolescence	comes	from	an	outside	and	non-human	force,	there	is	more	reason	to	adapt	and	change	your	expectations	as	to	what	it	is	that	gives	value	to	your	life.	This	supports	the	view	that	the	mechanism	of	obsolescence	makes	a	difference	to	its	axiological	impact.	I	elaborate	more	on	what	it	might	mean	to	change	your	expectations	regarding	value	in	your	life	in	the	next	section.	
There	are	a	two	other	critical	observations	to	be	made	about	Sparrow's	argument.	First,	Sparrow	does	not	specify	which	form	of	obsolescence	he	imagines	will	take	hold	in	his	hypothetical	future.	Is	it	actual-general	or	actual	specific,	or	some	other	variant?	It	is	unlikely	to	be	actual-general	obsolescence.	Even	in	the	case	of	enhanced	but	obsolete	humans,	there	are	still	plenty	of	things	they	can	do	and	be	useful	for.	They	can	still	form	friendships	and	intimate	relationships	with	one	another;	they	can	still	play	games	with	one	another;	they	can	still	drink	and	be	merry.	Perceived-general	obsolescence	may	be	more	likely,	particularly	if	the	society	in	which	these	enhanced	humans	live	remains	wedded	to	competitive	and	positional	ideologies,	such	as	capitalism.	The	narrow	forms	of	obsolescence	are,	of	course,	even	more	plausible,	but	if	they	are	very	narrow	then	the	axiological	impact	will	be	minimal:	the	negative	consequences	to	which	
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Sparrow	points	will	only	arise	in	certain	domains	of	activity	but	then	all	the	enhanced	humans	have	to	do	to	avoid	them	is	switch	to	another	domain.		
We	can	suppose	that	Sparrow	is	not	limiting	his	argument	to	a	very	narrow	form	of	obsolescence	--	his	argument	wouldn't	carry	much	weight	if	it	did.	So	he	must	be	imagining	a	broader	form	of	obsolescence	--	obsolescence	across	many,	many	domains	of	life	--	perhaps	bordering	on	perceived-general	obsolescence.	But	since	that	form	of	obsolescence	is	largely	a	function	of	the	prevailing	social	ideologies,	then,	as	I	will	argue	below,	the	key	to	addressing	his	worries	may	lie	not	so	much	in	reversing	the	tide	of	technological	progress	than	it	does	in	reforming	those	social	ideologies.	
This	brings	me	to	a	final	point	I	wish	to	make	about	Sparrow's	argument.	While	Sparrow	is	correct	in	saying	that	we	should	avoid	'naive	inevitablism'	about	technologically-induced	obsolescence,	it	is	equally	important	to	recognise	that	we	do	not	have	as	much	control	over	the	course	of	technological	development	as	we	would	like.	Sparrow's	own	view	is	that	the	problem	of	enhanced-obsolescence	arises	from	a	collective	action	problem:	the	decision	to	enhance	can	seem	individually	rational	and	beneficial,	but	if	everyone	does	it	we	end	up	in	the	enhanced	'rat	race'	that	has	all	the	negative	features	described	above.	This	is	why	Sparrow	calls	for	regulatory	intervention:	we	need	it	to	correct	for	the	flaws	in	individual	rationality.		
Sparrow	is	probably	right	about	this:	collective	action	problems	probably	do	lie	at	the	heart	of	this	issue.	But	they	go	deeper	than	Sparrow	supposes,	particularly	when	it	comes	to	automation-induced	obsolescence.	It	is	not	just	at	the	individual	level	that	the	collective	action	problem	arises:	it	is	also	at	the	institutional	and	societal	level.	Particular	companies	and	organisations	can	rationally	favour	automating	technologies	because	they	give	them	some	advantage	over	rivals.	The	same	is	true	for	particular	communities	and	governments	(partly	because	automating	technologies	are	associated	with	economic	growth	and	innovation).	Top-down	regulatory	interference	consequently	isn't	always	a	credible	solution	to	the	problem	automation-induced	obsolescence	since	the	top-down	regulators	are	implicated	in	it.	Of	course,	this	
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doesn't	mean	that	the	position	I	defend	in	the	next	section	is	immune	from	collective	action	problems.	It	suffers	from	them	too.	The	point	is	that	it	is	hard	to	address	the	societal	impact	of	technologically-induced	obsolescence.	Given	this,	perhaps	should	try	to	direct	our	energies	at	the	'solution'	to	the	problem	that	is	most	socially	desirable,	not	the	one	that	is	most	conservative	or	obvious?5		
I'll	now	argue	that	the	most	desirable	solution	might	be	to	embrace	obsolescence,	not	to	halt	it.	This	will	call	for	a	radical	reconceptualisation	of	obsolescence.	Instead	of	viewing	it	as	something	that	is	inherently	negative	or	pejorative	there	is	an	opportunity	to	reframe	it	as	a	positive.	Or	so,	at	least,	I	shall	argue.6	
	
5.	The	Case	for	Technologically-Induced	Obsolescence	
There	are	two	arguments	for	welcoming	technologically-induced	obsolescence.	The	first	argument	invites	the	reader	to	see	the	potential	upside	to	obsolescence;	the	second	argues	that	building	a	culture	of	obsolescence	could	be	a	desirable	response	to	the	problem	of	rapid	technological	advance.	In	both	cases,	the	arguments	speak	to	the	advantages	of	broad	forms	of	obsolescence	(both	actual	and	perceived)	and	not	just	narrow	forms.	It	is	relatively	easy	to	make	the	case	for	the	desirability	of	narrow	forms	of	obsolescence:	just	point	to	unpleasant	activities	that	humans	are	currently	under	pressure	to	perform	and																																																									5	Cf.	Agar	2013	and	2019	whose	solution	to	the	problem	of	humanity	being	‘left	behind’	focuses	more	on	preserving	and	conserving	our	current	set	of	values	over	and	above	radical	techno-social	transformation.	For	example,	in	Agar	2019,	he	favours	developing	a	‘social	economy’	that	provides	a	continued	place	for	humans	alongside	a	‘digital	economy’	that	doesn’t.	This	avoids	the	more	radical	economic	upheaval	that	could	be	caused	by	embracing	economic	automation	in	a	more	thoroughgoing	way.	6	There	are	other	objections	one	could	make	to	Sparrow's	argument.	Many	of	these	take	particular	umbrage	at	how	he	interprets	and	understands	the	enhancement	project.	For	example,	his	suggestion	that	the	enhancement	project	is	necessarily	committed	to	the	dynamics	of	competition	could	be	challenged.	Enhancement	is	a	fuzzy	concept	but	a	reasonable	case	can	be	made	that	some	forms	of	enhancement	may	not	require	an	improvement	in	capacities	relative	to	others	and	so	do	not	require	competition	and	positionality.	For	example,	enhancement	that	focuses	specifically	on	subjective	well-being	and	contentment.	
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argue	that	it	would	be	good	if	we	could	be	rendered	obsolete	from	those	activities;	it	is	more	challenging	to	make	the	case	for	broader	forms	of	obsolescence.	That	said,	both	arguments	should	be	read	with	the	earlier	caveat	in	mind:	complete	actual-general	obsolescence	is	probably	not	a	fully	coherent	notion	because	of	the	diversity	of	ends	that	humans	can	pursue	and	the	fact	that	some	activities	are	valued	for	their	intrinsic	performances	and	not	for	their	ends.	Indeed,	both	of	these	facts	will	feature	in	the	arguments	given	below.	
The	first	argument	is	simple.	Recall	that	obsolescence	arises	when	there	is	a	mismatch	between	internal	capacities	and	external	demands/standards.	Criticisms	of	obsolescence,	such	as	those	made	by	Sparrow,	dwell	on	the	fact	that	these	external	demands	and	standards	are	an	important	source	of	value.	Consider	the	fact	that	many	people	find	meaning	by	making	contributions	to	their	societies	through	their	activities	(be	they	economic,	political,	charitable	or	otherwise	in	nature).	It	is	only	if	they	can	make	those	contributions	that	they	(and	others)	will	attach	value	to	their	lives.	Call	this	a	"contributivist"	or	"productivist"	ethos.	Obsolescence	is	a	major	threat	to	the	contributivist	or	productivist	ethos	because	it	directly	impacts	on	people's	capacities	to	make	those	contributions.	Furthermore,	it's	not	just	the	obsolescence	itself	that	creates	this	crisis.	The	impending	threat	of	obsolescence	is	also	a	problem	because	it	makes	people	aware	that	the	opportunity	to	make	a	valuable	contribution	is	dwindling,	and	so	encourages	them	to	compete	with	one	another	for	those	few	remaining	opportunities.	This	dynamic	of	dwindling	opportunities	and	increased	competitiveness	lies	at	the	core	of	many	of	Sparrow's	fears	of	obsolescence.	
But,	to	state	the	obvious,	not	all	external	demands	and	standards	are	true	sources	of	value	and	meaning,	and	hence	not	all	competitions	to	meet	those	demands	are	worthy	of	respect.	Sometimes	our	societies	demand	things	of	us	that	are	counter-productive	to	living	a	valuable	and	meaningful	life.	Consider	an	extreme	example.	Imagine	a	physically	fit	young	man	living	in	Nazi	Germany.	This	young	man	would	probably	feel	a	crushing	weight	of	expectation	building	up	around	him	with	respect	to	making	a	contribution	to	that	society's	militaristic	and	genocidal	aims.	Even	if	he	himself	did	not	agree	with	those	aims,	or	had	a	strong	desire	to	do	something	else,	he	may	succumb	to	those	aims	due	to	the	
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mounting	social	pressure.	Contrariwise,	a	less	physically	fit	person,	or	an	older	person	past	the	prime	of	youth,	may	have	the	freedom	to	resist	the	militaristic	pressures.	Why?	Because	they	would	be	seen	as	obsolete	relative	to	the	militaristic	and	genocidal	aims.	In	other	words,	what	we	have	here	is	a	case	in	which	being	obsolete	could	actually	be	a	net	advantage	with	respect	to	the	desire	to	live	a	valuable	and	meaningful	life	(this	assumes,	for	sake	of	argument,	these	obsolete	people	were	not	perceived	as	enemies	to	the	fascistic	project	and	targeted	for	extermination).	
The	Nazi	example	is	instructive.	It	shows	us	that	not	all	contributivist	demands	are	sources	of	value	and	hence	not	all	forms	of	obsolescence	with	respect	to	those	demands	are	undesirable.	But	the	Nazi	example	is	appealing	only	because	of	its	historical	uniqueness.	It	tells	us	that	if	you	live	in	a	society	that	is	in	the	grip	of	a	dangerous	or	malevolent	ideology,	then	being	perceived	(or	actually	being)	obsolete	with	respect	to	the	ends	that	this	ideology	serves	might	be	a	good	thing	(if	--	and	it	could	be	a	big	if	--	that	the	society	treats	its	obsolete	members	humanely	and	leaves	them	to	their	own	devices).	Surely	that	is	the	exception	rather	than	the	rule?	Surely	the	norm	is	that	societies	are	not	in	the	grip	of	malevolent	ideologies	and	so	being	able	to	make	a	contribution	is	net	positive	(and	hence	being	obsolete	is	not)?	
There	are	two	things	to	be	said	in	response	to	this.	First,	many	societies	are	in	the	grip	of	ideologies	that	impose	unwelcome,	if	not	outrightly	malevolent,	standards	on	most	people.	For	example,	standards	of	beauty,	intelligence,	physical	fitness	and	so.	Consider,	once	again,	the	contributivist	or	productivist	ethos	that	prevails	in	the	modern	economic	world.	This	ethos	puts	a	lot	of	pressure	on	people	to	make	themselves	employable;	to	acquire	levels	of	education	and	skills	they	may	not	desire;	to	pursue	careers	they	may	not	want;	to	show	extreme	and	sometimes	debilitating	levels	of	dedication	to	their	work.	This	might	be	acceptable	if	people	could	simply	reject	these	external	standards	and	opt	out	of	economic	life,	but	this	is	not	a	viable	option	in	the	modern	world.	For	the	majority	of	people	abiding	by	the	contributivist	ethos	is	effectively	compulsory.	They	have	to	work	in	order	to	survive.	If	they	do	not	work,	when	they	are	able	to	do	so,	they	are	penalised.	David	Frayne,	in	his	excellent	
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ethnography	The	Refusal	of	Work	(2015),	documents	this	phenomenon,	highlighting	both	the	debilitating	effects	of	a	work-obsessed	culture	on	individuals,	as	well	as	the	difficulties	they	face	if	they	try	to	opt	out.	Others	have	offered	a	litany	of	arguments	against	the	ideology	of	work	(Danaher	2019a;	Srnicek	and	Williams	2015;	Bastani	2018).	Being	relieved	from	the	contributivist	standards	of	the	modern	labour	market,	which	is	pervasive	in	modern	societies,	could	consequently	be	a	great	relief	to	many	people.		
Related	to	this	there	is	the	fact	that	some	prevalent	external	standards	are	particularly	problematic	for	specific	groups	of	people.	Consider	for	example,	the	erotic	expectations	and	standards	that	are	imposed	on	women	in	patriarchal	societies.	Under	the	norms	of	those	societies,	they	are	expected	to	behave	in	certain	ways	and	achieve	certain	standards	of	beauty	and	sexual	desirability.	Writing	in	the	18th	Century,	Marie	Thérèse	de	Lambert	highlighted	this	problem	and	noted	that	becoming	sexually	obsolete	–	as	a	result	of	old	age	–	could	be	liberating	for	women	because	it	could	free	them	from	the	yoke	of	these	patriarchal	standards.	As	she	put	it:		
[Old	age]	liberates	us	from	the	tyranny	of	opinion.	When	one	is	young,	one	only	
dreams	of	living	in	the	idea	of	someone	else;	one	must	establish	one’s	
reputation	and	create	for	oneself	an	honorable	place	in	the	imagination	of	
others,	and	be	happy	even	in	their	idea;	our	happiness	is	not	at	all	real,	it	is	not	
ourselves	whom	we	consult	but	others.	
(Quoted	in	Blank	2018,	299-300)		
Lambert	is,	admittedly,	speaking	to	a	bygone	age.	The	patriarchal	standards	imposed	on	women	are	no	doubt	less	severe	than	they	once	were	(though	they	are	certainly	still	present).	Nevertheless,	her	observation	resonates,	in	part	because	it	is	generalisable.	She	is	highlighting	the	fact	that	being	freed	from	the	tyranny	of	other	people’s	opinions	and	standards	can	be	a	good	thing	if	it	allows	us	to	pursue	a	more	authentic	form	of	happiness.	
This	brings	me	to	the	second	point	I	wished	to	make	in	response	to	concerns	about	the	Nazi	example.	Even	if	we	live	in	societies	in	which	the	
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external	standards	are	generally	beneficent,	the	mere	fact	that	they	are	imposed	on	us	at	all	is	contrary	to	freedom	and	autonomy.	We	don’t	get	to	choose	our	own	ideals.	Actual	or	perceived	general	obsolescence	could	be	a	great	boon	for	freedom	and	autonomy	in	this	regard.	Because	obsolescence	implies	that	external	standards	are	no	longer	thought	to	apply	to	your	case,	you	can	decide	what	to	do	for	yourself.	Brian	O’Connor	(2018)	captures	the	advantage	of	this	lifestyle	rather	well	in	his	book	on	Idleness	when	he	notes	that	one	of	the	problems	with	contemporary	society	is	that	we	cannot	be	truly	autonomous	because	we	always	have	to	contend	with	external	demands.	One	way	that	this	manifests	itself	is	in	the	rejection	of	idleness	as	an	appropriate	state	for	an	adult	human	being	to	be	in.	To	be	idle	is	to	be	frivolous,	at	best,	and	a	social	parasite	at	worst.	Contrary	to	this,	O’Connor	suggests	that	embracing	idleness	may	be	the	way	to	secure	an	idealised	form	of	individual	autonomy.	This	is	difficult	in	a	world	with	rampant	contributivist	pressures.	But	this,	then,	is	a	reason	to	welcome	widespread,	technologically-induced	obsolescence.	It	will	enable	us	to	live	in	a	guilt-free	state	of	idleness.	
There	is	an	obvious	objection	to	this	line	of	reasoning:	not	all	standards	are	imposed	from	the	outside-in.	Surely,	it	could	be	argued,	some	people	develop	their	own	internal	standards	and	then	are	tragically	frustrated	and	thwarted	by	their	technologically-induced	obsolescence	when	they	fail	to	match	them	in	the	desired	way.	Suppose,	for	example,	Albert	has	wanted	to	be	a	surgeon	from	his	early	teens.	He	sees	this	goal	as	the	ultimate	expression	of	his	own	desires	and	the	ideal	way	to	flourish	given	his	competencies	and	capacities.	He	spends	twenty	years	of	his	life	educating	himself	and	honing	his	surgical	skills.	Sadly,	just	at	the	end	of	his	education,	a	surgical	robot	is	created	that	can	vastly	outperform	Albert	on	all	relevant	metrics.	Wouldn’t	this	be	a	case	in	which	a	performance	standard	was	chosen	by	the	individual	and	in	which	it	was	bad	thing	that	they	were	rendered	obsolete	by	technology?	
Albert’s	fate	is	certainly	a	bad	thing	(for	him),	but	we	should	question	the	assumptions	underlying	the	thought	experiment.	For	starters,	it	is	unlikely	that	Albert’s	chosen	performance	standard	(skill	in	surgery)	was	completely	of	his	own	making.	He	probably	picked	from	among	the	career	options	made	available	
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to	him	in	his	given	socio-cultural	milieu.	His	choice	among	those	options	may	have	been	his	own	–	we	can	ignore	the	complexities	of	free	will	and	determinism	here	–	but	it	was	still	a	choice	from	among	a	selection	of	socially	acceptable	and	educationally	feasible	options.	Furthermore,	Albert’s	tragedy	is	probably	compounded	by	the	fact	that	he	wasn’t	given	other	options	to	choose	from.	He	no	doubt	grew	up	–	as	we	all	do	–	in	cultures	in	which	we	imbibe	the	belief	that	success	in	a	career	is	the	primary	route	to	happiness	and	fulfillment.	What	if	he	were	given	other	options?	What	if	he	grew	up	in	a	culture	in	which	the	contributivist	ethos	was	not	dominant?	
This	is	where	the	second	argument	in	favour	of	obsolescence	comes	into	play.	This	argument	claims	that	building	a	culture	of	obsolescence	–	that	is:	a	culture	in	which	humans	are	not	expected	or	encouraged	or	demanded	to	meet	certain	external	standards,	nor	valued	primarily	for	their	ability	to	contribute	economically	or	otherwise	to	society,	but	are	instead	freed	from	the	yoke	of	external	standards	–	might	be	the	best	way	to	cope	with	rapid	technologically-induced	change.	There	are	two	key	assumptions	at	play	in	this	argument.	The	first	is	that	advances	in	technology	–	particularly	in	technologies	of	automation	and	AI	–	can	be	beneficial	to	human	society.	They	can	enable	faster,	more	efficient	and	more	widely	distributed	goods	and	services.	This	isn’t	always	true,	of	course.	Sometimes	the	technologies	can	misfire,	or	be	less	efficient	or	less	fair	than	we	initially	presumed,	but	if	they	live	up	to	their	potential	they	can	be	beneficial.	The	second	assumption	is	that	the	major	downside	to	these	technologies	‘living	up	to’	their	potential	is	that	they	replace	and	render	humans	obsolete	in	the	process.	This,	however,	is	only	a	major	problem	if	we	live	in	a	society	in	which	human	obsolescence	is	viewed	as	a	tragedy.	Thus,	if	we	build	a	culture	in	which	obsolescence	is	welcomed,	we	can	avoid	the	downside	risks	of	technological	change,	while	embracing	its	benefits.	This	is	true	irrespective	of	whether	technologically-induced	obsolescence	is	inevitable,	but	the	argument	might	be	even	more	persuasive	if	obsolesence	is	inevitable.	In	that	case,	we	would	have	the	choice	of	either	embracing	our	inevitable	obsolescence	or	raging	against	it	in	futility.	The	former	would	seem	obviously	more	desirable	than	the	latter.	
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There	are	some	obvious	objections	to	this	second	argument.	One	objection	is	that	creating	a	culture	of	obsolescence	is	impossible.	Maybe	we	are	too	wedded	to	the	contributivist	ethos	to	allow	for	such	a	systematic	and	radical	change	in	our	governing	ideology	to	take	hold?	There	is	undoubtedly	some	truth	to	this	objection	but	there	is	also	some	reason	for	optimism.	As	mentioned	earlier	in	this	article,	there	is	an	almost	endless	set	of	human	activities	and	some	human	activities	are	not	valued	primarily	or	solely	for	their	instrumental	purposes	or	ends.	Think,	again,	of	games	or	relationships	or	the	bodily	pleasures	of	food,	drink	and	sex.	A	culture	of	obsolescence	is	one	in	which	these	kinds	of	activities,	as	opposed	to	contributivist	ones,	are	given	pride	of	place.	Furthermore,	most	activities	have	several	different	‘loci	of	value’.	In	other	words,	they	are	valued	for	both	internal	or	intrinsic	reasons	–	e.g.	because	of	the	skilled	or	pleasurable	performances	they	involve	–	and	for	instrumental	reasons	–	e.g.	because	they	make	the	world	a	better	place	or	contribute	to	economic	ends.	Building	a	culture	of	obsolescence	requires	shifting	focus	to	away	from	the	instrumental	reasons	for	valuing	activities	and	focusing	more	attention	on	the	intrinsic	reasons	for	valuing	them.	This	will	be	a	challenge	but	it	is	not	infeasible	and,	to	a	large	extent,	we	can	continue	to	do	the	things	we	already	find	pleasurable;	it’s	just	that	we	derive	value	from	them	in	a	different	way.			
Another	obvious	objection	is	that	there	is	something	hollow	or	sad	about	a	culture	of	obsolescence.	At	the	heart	of	any	such	culture	would	be	the	acceptance	of	the	fact	that	humans	can	no	longer	compete	or	achieve	certain	standards.	This	would	imply	stepping	back	from	the	world	and	retreating	into	ourselves	and	our	own	preferred	conception	of	the	good	life.	This	might	be	a	boon	for	radical	liberals	or	libertarians,	but	many	people	will	see	it	as	an	empty	ideal.	They	want	to	make	a	contribution	to	their	societies	and	to	humanity.	This	is	an	important	objection	but	one	with	less	bite	than	might	be	supposed.		For	one	thing,	aspects	of	the	good	life	that	are	currently	highly	valued	by	many	people	are	still	possible	in	a	world	in	which	activities	are	valued	for	themselves	and	not	for	their	broader	consequences.	Dedication	to	mastering	an	non-instrumental,	relatively	activity	(e.g.	a	game	like	activity)	can	allow	people	to	achieve	mastery	over	a	certain	set	of	skills	and	hone	their	agency.	If	the	activity	is	one	that	
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requires	communication	and	coordination	with	others,	this	can	allow	for	the	goods	of	cooperation	and	social	bonding	to	flourish.		
This	connects	to	a	deeper	philosophical	point	that	can	be	made	about	the	nature	of	human	goods	and	the	development	of	virtuous	character.	As	Alisdair	MacIntyre	(2007)	observes	in	his	influential	work	on	virtue,	human	goods	and	virtues	are	not	best	defined	or	understood	in	the	abstract.	They	only	really	take	on	meaning	in	the	context	of	particular	practices	or	activities.7	Every	activity	has	goods	that	are	internal	to	the	performance	of	that	activity	and	this,	in	turn,	leads	to	a	conception	of	virtuous	activity	that	is	tied	to	those	internal	goods.	Thus,	for	example,	there	are	goods	associated	with	the	practice	of	chess-playing	–	strategic	playing,	intelligent	move-making,	efficiency	–	and	virtues	that	a	good	chess	player	will	develop	–	decisiveness,	courageousness,	generosity	and	graciousness	–	that	can	only	be	defined	and	understood	relative	to	the	rules	of	the	game.	This	is	true	for	all	other	goods	and	virtues	too,	even	if	they	are	not	explicitly	defined	by	a	set	of	rules.	In	other	words,	there	is	a	way	to	be	a	good	ballet	dancer	or	baker	or	bank	manager,	but	there	is	no	way	to	be	good	simpliciter	or	in	general.	What	it	means	to	be	good	must	be	determined	and	evaluated	relative	to	the	nature	of	particular	activities.	This	theory	implies	a	robust	form	of	pluralism	when	it	comes	to	figuring	out	what	is	valuable	and	what	it	means	to	live	a	good	life.	You	can	pick	any	activity	and	figure	out	a	way	to	perform	that	activity	that	achieves	certain	goods	(internal	to	that	activity)	and	this	allows	you	to	build	certain	virtues	(relative	to	those	internal	goods).	This	theory	of	the	good	life	provides	succour	to	anyone,	like	me,	who	wants	to	argue	that	a	robust	form	of	the	good	life	is	possible	in	a	world	of	technologically-induced	obsolescence.	It	suggests	that,	far	from	being	hollow	or	empty,	an	obsolescent	life	can	be	rich	and	valuable	as	long	as	we	pursue	activities	in	the	right	way.																																																										7	MacIntyre’s	theory	is	subtle	and	complex.	He	maintains	that	there	are	general	abstract	virtues	that	can	be	shared	across	activities,	but	he	argues	that	they	are	relatively	hollow	and	uninformative	when	considered	in	the	abstract.	For	an	excellent	exposition	of	his	theory,	which	I	relied	upon	heavily	for	this	discussion,	see	Higgins	(2011).	Shannon	Vallor,	in	Technology	and	the	Virtues	applies	MacIntyre’s	theory	specifically	to	developing	a	virtue	ethics	for	technology.	In	a	sense,	the	argument	in	this	paper	could	be	allied	to	Vallor’s	project	insofar	as	I	am	suggesting	that	certain	forms	of	technology	could	warrant	a	shift	to	an	ethic	of	obsolescence.	Vallor	may	or	may	not	welcome	this	association.	
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Of	course,	it	is	not	that	simple.	MacIntyre’s	theory	is	just	one	among	many.	Furthermore,	MacIntyre	himself	acknowledges	that	you	can	only	push	this	value	pluralism	so	far.	Although	goods	and	virtues	take	on	meaning	only	relative	to	activities,	those	activities	have	to	both	(a)	fit	or	make	sense	within	an	individual’s	life	narrative	and	(b)	cohere	with	the	broader	moral	tradition/community	in	which	the	individual	lives.	If	I	steadfastly	believe	that	my	life	only	has	value	if	I	make	some	economic	contribution	to	my	society,	and	if	the	society	in	which	I	live	reinforces	that	belief,	then	I	am	unlikely	to	achieve	the	good	life	in	a	set	of	activities	that	confirm	my	obsolescence.	But	this	is	where	the	idea	of	building	a	culture	of	obsolescence	comes	into	play.	If	we	build	such	a	culture	then	an	individual	can	structure	a	life	narrative	that	accepts	obsolescence	and	can	have	that	life	narrative	reinforced	by	the	community	in	which	they	live.	This	can	allow	the	internal	goods	and	associated	virtues	of	obsolescent	activity	to	thrive.	
	
6.	Conclusion	
This	article	has	presented	an	extended	analysis	of	the	axiological	impact	of	human	obsolescence.	It	has	argued	that	human	obsolescence	arises	when	there	is	some	mismatch	between	an	individual’s	capacities	and	some	external	performance	benchmark	or	standard	such	that	the	individual	is	unable	to	attain	that	standard.	It	has	argued	that	human	obsolescence	can	take	at	least	four	distinct	forms:	actual-general,	actual-narrow,	perceived-general	and	perceived-narrow.	Of	these	four	forms	of	obsolescence,	the	last	three	are	plausible	threats	to	the	value	of	a	human	life.	The	first	–	actual-general	–	is	not	plausible	except	in	certain	special	circumstances	(e.g.	catastophic	individual	loss	of	capacity	through	illness	or	injury).	Turning	its	attention	to	technologically-induced	obsolescence,	the	article	has	also	argued	that	existing	critiques	of	this	phenomenon,	particularly	Robert	Sparrow’s	critiques	of	enhancement-induced	obsolescence,	are	not	as	strong	as	they	first	appear,	and	that	there	are,	in	fact,	two	reasons	to	embrace	general/broad	forms	of	technologically-induced	obsolescence:	(i)	being	released	from	the	burden	of	external	standards	can	be	liberating	and	
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empowering,	particularly	when	those	standards	are	bad	or	unjust	and	(ii)	building	a	culture	that	celebrates	human	obsolescence	may	be	the	best	way	to	benefit	from	technological	progress.		
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